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Pension Funds under Investments Constraints:  
An Assessment of the Opportunity Cost to the Greek Social Security System 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In this paper we study the opportunity loss of the Greek social security system in 
terms of risk and return, caused by the inflexible investment constraints under which 
Greek pension funds operated in the period 1958-2000. Using data on pension fund 
reserves as well as on money and capital market yields, we evaluate retrospectively 
the risks and returns of a more pro-investment fund reserve management by analyzing 
an indicative number of investment scenarios in local and international money and 
capital markets. In order to estimate local currency yields for international investment, 
we generate for the entire period – covering both a fixed and a partially floating 
exchange rates regime – a corresponding series of exchange rate variations based on 
the official rate fluctuations and inflation differentials. Our results suggest that in the 
43-year period, there has been a significant opportunity loss in the system both in risk 
and returns: first, by excluding Greek bank deposits and Greek capital market 
securities that would have propped returns up at acceptable levels of risk and, second, 
by not allowing for some degree of international diversification that would have kept 
overall downside risk down. This opportunity loss could have alleviated, to some 
extent, the current imbalance of the system, had some of the restrictive investment 
rules been relaxed.  
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1. Introduction 
Equity investment for and financial management of pension fund wealth, especially 
reserves, has been in the center of social security discussions, proposals and reforms 
for the last twenty years or so, worldwide as well as in Europe. Because of adverse 
demographics and a sluggish economy, a majority of governments have taken actions 
redesigning the system’s parameters and liberalizing financial investment. Such 
actions aimed at restoring actuarial and financial imbalance affecting their social 
security systems.  
 The financial debacle of the sub-primes and the economic crisis that followed 
hit the world economy and impinged upon the issue of pension equity investment in 
two ways. First, negative growth rates and increasing unemployment has put pension 
finance under even greater strain and exacerbated their imbalance. Second, negative 
stock market returns had a drastic effect on affected pension reserves, at least for 
those funds that had chosen during the past decade to allow for a more pro-equity 
investment. 
 Adverse stock market developments have also had the effect of confirming the 
fears and suspicions of those who had opposed social security reforms in the first 
place. Paradoxically, the more the authorities were reluctant to liberalization and the 
longer the consultations between authorities and social groups, the greater the equity 
loss because of a ‘latecomer effect’. Perhaps healthier social security systems could 
be expected to recover from the current downtrend in income and reserves once their 
economies begin to grow again and equity losses could be temporarily sustained. The 
same does not apply to weak and unbalanced systems like the Greek social security 
system that consecutively resisted serious reforms in terms of eventually matching 
inflows to outflows.  
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 In what position would the Greek social security be, had it adopted a more 
pro-equity investment, in the right time and not in the last hour? In what position 
would it be, if the existent restrictions on pension reserves investment had receded in 
favor of a regulation allowing for a richer opportunity set? This is in our opinion the 
appropriate question one has to ask and not rely exclusively on the recent equity 
losses that are actually being recorded. The reason for addressing this particular 
question is because the older and stricter investment policy rules were imposed for 
most of the period since the system’s creation and only recently had been abandoned. 
Even today, after some relaxation of the restrictions, investment in domestic equity, 
mutual funds and real estate account for a maximum of only 23% of total pension 
reserves.   
The benefits of the system, if it were to allow for a more liberal investment 
policy on domestic money and capital market, have been recently studied by Milonas, 
Papachristou and Roupas (2007) who found that the returns to risks ratio would 
improve significantly, if reserves had been invested freely in the local money market 
and the Greek stock exchange. Yet, that study fell short of investigating the effect of 
diversification in foreign markets. The present paper aims to close this gap in the 
literature and offer policy recommendations regarding financial management in the 
Greek social security system. In particular, the objective of the present paper is to 
provide evidence of what would have been achieved by the system, had there been a 
more flexible investment policy that allowed investments in both local and 
international markets.  
 The effect of investing in equity and other riskier assets on the risks and perils 
of pension fund reserves has been studied by a number of authors [Munnel and 
Balduzzi (1998), Weller (2000) and the referenced articles therein, and Weller and 
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Wenger (2008)]. Empirical research offered a scientific argument to those who 
supported financial management liberalization and an increased number of European 
countries have reformed their social security systems lowering their restriction to 
equity investment.1 Pension fund managers and social security systems that followed 
suit not only have they greatly benefited in the last 15 years from the stock market 
boom, but they also had time to built up strong capital gains that would help them to 
deal with the ensuing financial and economic crisis of the late 2000.2  
Our argument must not be misunderstood. While we argue that risk exposure 
alone is not a panacea to the pressing structural problems of unreformed security 
systems, yet we accept that a reasonable risk exposure will mitigate, to some extent, 
the inefficiencies of the system, by achieving a higher return per unit of risk. 
The paper is developed as follows. In Section 2, we describe the present state 
of the Greek social security system, its basic characteristics, the major reforms 
implemented so far and rules, regulation, restriction on pension investments as well as 
the portfolio composition of pension funds in the period 1958-2000. Section 3 
provides a description of the data and sources, and the methodology of balanced 
bootstrapping used in creating annual yields scenarios for the period under study. In 
Section 4 we discuss the international finance issues in the 1958–2000 period and 
propose an homogenous measure of exchange rate variation in fixed as well as in 
floating exchange rates regimes.  Empirical results are presented and discussed in 
Section 5, while summary and concluding comments are presented in a final Section.    
 
                                               
1
 According to OECD Global Pension Statistics, in 2006 pension fund assets in selected OECD 
countries were allocated almost 50% of total investments to equities and investment funds such as 
private equity and hedge funds. 
2
 Over the fifteen year period from 1994 and up to October 2008, the average annual pension fund 
returns for UK, US and Sweden were estimated to be 9.1%, 10.5% and 11.7%, respectively. Source: 
Pension Markets in Focus, December 2008, Issue 5, p.5, OECD. 
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2. The Greek Social Security System 
All pension schemes irrespective of the mode of operation accumulate surpluses 
during the first few decades since their inception. Over time, though, pension 
liabilities mature, demographics might change and growth rates may not be able to 
sustain the funds needed. In such a case deficits may prevail over surpluses.3 This is 
the trend that most, if not all, developed countries are in. Given that this trend will 
continue in the years to come, increased macroeconomic imbalances are bound to 
force governments to change the parameters of the social security systems.4 This is 
especially true for the Euro zone countries that share the same currency and are 
required to keep their budget deficits and public debts to minimum set levels. As a 
result, the European Commission demands reforms in the social security systems so 
that no additional strains are added to the basic macroeconomic variables. In line to 
these demands, many European governments have introduced reforms or are in the 
process of reforming their social security systems.5 The Greek social security system 
is one such example, especially because of its unique characteristics. For Greece to 
become competitive it is imperative that it must change the basic parameters to its 
social security system to make it viable again.6  
                                               
3
 Pension funds, just like any economic entity, are subject to monetary risks. Their outlays increase 
over time and one thing that should be considered is the preservation of the purchase power of the 
capital paid as pension stipend. 
4Barr (2000) recognizes the government as the key principal in reforming the pension system, 
irrespective of how the latter is run. He also argues that a necessary condition for a successful reform is 
an effective government. 
5
 For example, see Koch and Thimann (1999) for a thorough analysis of needed reform for the 
Austrian social security system. Disney (2000) analyzed the difficulties run by OECD 
countries in their pension systems and examined various reform options been suggested. 
Holzmann et al (2003) presented the reform progress that has been made in European 
countries.  Sakellaropoulos (2003) has presented the social policy issues surrounding the 
reform in the European pension systems, including the Greek pension system. 
6
 A series of reforms in the last two decades in Greece illustrate the difficulty of bringing the 
Greek model of pension provision in line with the policy goals of the ‘‘European social 
model’’ [see Vlachantoni (2005)]. 
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2.1 The Basic Characteristics of the Greek Social Security System 
The Greek social security system was put in service in 1950 as the primary system to 
provide health and pension stipends to eligible members. The system was designed on 
a Pay-As-You-Go basis and, as a result, not all inflows were allocated to reserves. 
Since for the first three or so decades the system was not mature, the inflows 
surpassed the outflows and there was no pressure on government officials to establish 
an appropriate base for reserves. Instead, time after time the governments utilized 
most of the inflows to finance various state projects. The understanding was that the 
state will accommodate the on-coming deficits of the system when needed. 
 Besides being insufficient on an actuarial basis, reserves were restricted to 
certain types of investments, such as, mandatory deposits with the Bank of Greece, 
demand and time deposits, treasury bills and treasury bonds. With these restrictions 
the governments secured the financing for their own policies. However, this policy 
provided sub-optimal yields for the system’s reserves. (More on Section 2.3) 
Another characteristic of the system is that there were multiple social security 
providers resulting in complexity, fragmentation of the security coverage, inefficiency 
and inequalities across secured individuals.7 According to the 2008 social budget 
data,8 there are 50 different main and supplementary pension funds, and 133 
organisations of broader social protection under the supervision of 6 Ministries.9 It is 
worth noting that despite the approximately 20 main social security funds, 90% of the 
                                               
7
 Sectorial fragmentation, lack of a central executive body and piece-meal supervision of social security 
organizations prevented the establishment of a common insurance perception, thus giving rise to 
inequalities among the funds of various trader and professional groups in terms of contributions and 
benefits (pension amount, one-off allowance, medical care, etc.). 
8
 Social Budgets 1970-2008. 
9
 The large number of pension funds leads to a high administrative cost. Social security funds employ 
approx. 1% of the labour force and spend 3% of the GDP annually, when the average social security 
fund staff expenses in OECD countries is estimated to be half of this amount versus total insurance 
protection expenses.  
 8 
insured (4,040,870) and pensioners (2,282,480) in 2008 were covered by 3 funds, i.e. 
ΙΚΑ (Social Insurance Institute) 46.3%, ΟΑΕΕ (Self-Employed Insurance 
Organisation) 14.1% and OGA (Agricultural Insurance Fund) 29.5%. It is only the 
remaining 10% of the population that is covered by the remaining 17 smaller funds. 
Note that the state secures all public sector employees through a separate fund. 
When measuring pension fund assets per insured individual, an interesting 
characteristic emerges. There exist two types of pension funds, those with sufficient 
reserves and those funds with insufficient reserves. Furthermore, the funds with the 
most assets are not necessarily the funds with the most members. There are pension 
funds with large reserves that make them viable, despite all social security system 
inefficiencies. In contrast, there are other funds which will fail to meet their 
obligations after a month if contributions and grants are discontinued. The banking 
sector funds are listed among those with the highest reserves per insured member.10 
At the other extreme, IKA is among the funds with the poorest assets per insured, 
although it covers most of the insured people followed by ΟΑΕΕ, OGA etc. The Fund 
of Independent Professionals (OAEE) is the third biggest in the country in terms of 
members (860,000) but the tenth biggest in terms of assets value. The Consolidated 
Wage Earners’ Auxiliary Pension Fund (ETEAM) is the second biggest in terms of 
members (1,700,000) but 23rd in terms of asset value.  
 Finally, one common characteristic of all pension fund organizations is the 
absence of professional asset management. The responsibility of investment decisions 
rests upon the Board of Directors whose members are various state officials and 
employee representatives and most of whom are not familiar with money and capital 
                                               
10
 Such discrepancies are the result of better pay for members of rich funds, special taxes levied on the 
public on behalf of certain funds, generous employer or state contributions to certain funds and 
widespread tax and contribution evasion in other funds.   
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markets. The lack of professional asset management is another implicit cost to 
pension funds that contributed to earning low returns.  
 
2.2 Recent Major Reforms in the Greek Social Security System 
Evidence of an imbalance in the Greek pension system appeared as early as in the 
beginning of the 80's. The major pension organizations had begun facing large deficits 
growing rapidly in the following years. Deficits were increasing with such a rate that 
in the beginning of the 90's it was feared that the social security system would 
collapse.11 Internal factors (large administrative costs, sub-optimal investments 
policies) along with external factors (economic growth rate, inflation, demographic 
developments, unemployment, etc.) had been blamed for the worsening situation in 
the system. 
In 1990-92, when it was widely understood that the system was non-viable, 
three laws were enacted (Laws 1902/90, 1976/91 and 2084/92) in a considerable 
effort to curtail deficits and add rationalization to the social security system. The 
enacted measures addressed to both outflows (by decreasing the salary to pension 
ratio, changing the salary indexation, applying stricter criteria on benefits, unifying 
pension rights, etc.) as well as inflows (mainly increase in the contributions, etc.). 
The changes resulted in a remarkable primary deficit decrease (30%) at real 
prices in 1991–93. According to OECD estimates, the total effect of the changes 
brought by Law 1902/90 amounted to 3 percentage points of the GDP in the first three 
years of implementation.12 However, this positive trend was reversed after 1994 to the 
point that in 1999 the primary deficit approximated the 1989 level at real prices. This 
                                               
11The increasing deficits were initially covered through borrowing from banks, later though subsidies 
were allocated from the ordinary budget.  
12
 See OECD (1996). 
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return to the previous non-viable situation led to another reform on 2002. Law 
3029/02 made additional state funding in the system compulsory, changed again the 
parameters of the system and introduced the second pillar of occupational pension 
funds. Yet, these changes were only minimal and the problem of social security 
system reform was put on the agenda immediately after.  
In 2008 a new reform (Law 3655/08) took place with mostly administrative 
content and no immediate economic results since expected benefits were to accrue in 
the following years and through the gradual implementation of reforms. The new law 
forced the merging of the 133 existing social security organizations to only 13.13 Also 
passed were new measures raising the retirement age, discouraging early retirement 
and providing incentives to prolong employment. The major aim of this regulatory 
change was to limit the fragmentation of the insurance system, achieve economies of 
scale, establish substantial control and supervision; overcome major administrative 
and organisational difficulties, and cut down on the vast administrative and operating 
costs. 
Regarding the reserves of the merged insurance funds, the new enacted Law 
3655/08 provided limited improvement since individual fund assets would remain 
separate and there would be a relevant independence. However, regarding the 
management of the reserves, it would be subject to uniform rules, that is, there would 
be single investment targets but returns on investment would be distributed pro rata to 
the merged funds. The asset returns that may be achieved by the 13 insurance 
organisations are estimated to be many times higher than the asset returns that would 
have been earned from the 133 individual funds.       
                                               
13
 This occurred by merging and integrating into existing social security organisations. For instance, 
several major insurance funds, such as those of Hellenic Telecommunication Organization, Public 
Power Corporation, Banks, etc., were integrated into the largest insurance organization, ΙΚΑ. 
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2.3 The Role of Fund Reserves, Investment Restrictions and Regulation 
The policy adopted in 1950 opted to utilize pension cash reserves and other pension 
assets to attain general economic and development targets of the country. As a result, 
pension funds were forced to deposit their reserves with the Bank of Greece at an 
interest rate defined by the Ministry of Economy.14 This regulation not only prevented 
the funds from managing their reserves at their discretion but also led to loss of 
income, as the rate on these deposits was usually set at very low levels compared to 
the existing rates on savings and time deposits.15 In particular, the interest rate on the 
mandatory deposits at the Bank of Greece was fixed at 4% in the period 1950-1973. 
In the same period the savings interest rate was 7% - 9% while the consumer price 
index rose from 5.7% to 27.7%.16 
It is thus understood that pension funds suffered significant loss of income, 
which in turn led to the creation of deficits, especially between 1972 and 1990 when 
there was a vast divergence between the mandatory deposit rate, the savings rate and 
the price index.  
The magnitude of the opportunity loss to the pension reserves from the above 
investment restrictions can be seen graphically in Figure 1. The yields earned were set 
much lower compared to rates in savings and time deposits and treasury bills. 
Mandatory deposit rates were upward adjusted after 1973 but for most of the period 
                                               
14
 The institutional framework forced pension organizations to deposit the largest part of their reserve 
funds with the Bank of Greece which managed these amount on their behalf. Timid emancipation steps 
were first taken in 2001. Today new reserve funds can be invested more flexibly (see below in this 
section). Old reserves are required to be invested under the old restrictive investment constraints.  
15
 According to data of the Bank of Greece, the reserves of pension funds had returns much lower that 
the existent inflation rates over long periods of time. As a result their Net Asset Value had been 
significantly depreciated. 
16
 Roupas (2003), p. 88. 
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were set again lower than the other rates. Only after 1994 when mandatory deposits 
were lifted, pension funds earned market rates in the instruments they invested.  
 
Insert Figure 1 here 
 
In Figure 2 there is graphical representation of the portfolio composition of the 
entire Greek social security pension fund reserves in accommodation of the imposed 
investment restrictions. For most of the years since the inception of the system 
mandatory deposits was the predominant portion of pension portfolios. Indeed, 
mandatory deposits with the Central Bank accounted for more than 75% of total 
reserves until 1984 leaving little room for bank deposits and even less room for 
acquiring Greek treasury bills. Investments in treasury bills have gradually increased 
since 1974 as percent of total reserves with corresponding decrease in mandatory 
deposits. Treasury bonds became an investment choice since 1987 just before bank 
deregulation. Equity was allowed in pension portfolios as early as 1975 and up to 
10% of total reserves. Yet, equity investments did not materialize prior to 1991. 
During that year equity entered into pension portfolios slowly and today it makes up 
pension fund portfolios up to a maximum of 23% of total reserves. It should be 
mentioned that the 23% category, besides equity, includes investments in any kind of 
domestic mutual funds. Finally, none of the investments is allowed to be directed in 
foreign assets or foreign currency. 
 
Insert Figure 2 here 
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To understand the significance of the opportunity loss imposed on pension 
funds, it should be stressed here that from 1950 to 1980 the system had not yet 
entered a maturity stage. As a consequence major reserve amounts had accumulated 
which had there been used efficiently, they could contribute to the financing of the 
deficits that had emerged later as a result of the economic crisis, the decrease in 
economic growth and the deterioration in the dependency ratio.  
This policy worked against the interests of the social security system while it 
provided ample benefits to the Bank of Greece. The latter earned large commissions 
from pension funds as well as the interest differential set in its favour. Although the 
Bank of Greece supported all economic policies of the state and provided financing 
when needed thus producing social benefits, some of the benefits out of pension funds 
were funnelled to private interests since a number of its shares belong to private 
shareholders. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
Data on pension funds finance are available from three different sources: the Central 
Bank, the National Statistical Service and the Ministry of Labor. Central Bank time-
series covers the period from 1950 to 2000 for all pension funds and for all types of 
reserves’ investment, with the exception of equity investment; the latter is taken from 
the Ministry of Labor time-series, starting as late as 1990, since investment in a 
restricted number of Greek stocks did not occur prior to that date. Data on the US 
dollar and German mark official exchange rates are stated as local currency units per 
one unit of foreign currency. Greek, US and German consumer price indices are end 
of year levels and along with currency rates are retrieved from the International 
Financial Statistics Website. 
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 Simulated returns are generated by non parametric methods of bootstrapping.17 
A balanced sample of returns scenarios is made possible by selecting each time the 
first N=43 elements of a NxN vector of randomly permutated histories of returns. 
This method allows for every historical return to appear with equal probability and 
guarantees that simulated returns scenarios have mean and standard deviation equal to 
their sample counterpart. 
 The same method of balanced bootstrapping was one of the methods used to 
generate simulated returns in our previous study in Milonas et al. (2007) where 
international investment opportunities were left out. In order to allow for comparisons 
between our present results with those of our previous research we re-estimate the risk 
and return variables both with and without international investment.  
  Simulated stock return scenarios are plugged into the pension fund’s basic 
accounting identity in order to evaluate the distribution of reserves at some terminal 
date under alternative investment strategies. These strategies are confined to the strict 
and constrained investment rules of the pension fund system. The basic accounting 
identity is defined in equation (1) : 
111 1 +++ +





+≡ ∑ t
i
i
t
i
ttt NCFrxVV                                                                        (1) 
where: 
)1( +ttV : fund reserves at end of period t ( 1+t )  
i
tx : percentage of total fund reserves invested on asset i  at end of period t   
i
tr 1+ : return on asset i in period 1+t  
1+tNCF : net cash flow of the fund in period 1+t  
 
                                               
17
 See Efron and Tibshirani (1993) 
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Allowing for different weights to be invested on assets i, we can come up with 
an alternative investment strategy ][ itx  that will start at t=0 with the same original 
fund reserves and endowed with the respective net cash flows in every period as in the 
basic case. Asset weights are changed according to some defined scenarios and 
introduce the missing investment flexibility to the pension fund system. This 
alternative strategy that allows for the time evolution of fund reserves is given by 
equation (2): 
111 1 +++ +





+≡ ∑ t
i
i
t
i
ttt NCFrxVV                                                                        (2) 
with 00 VV =  
The original series of pension reserves, TttV ,...,1][ = , the original investment 
vector of weights in each asset i, ][ itx  Ni Tt ,...,1,...,1== , the return vector on all investments 
except stock and foreign currency investment, ][ itr si Tt≠= ,...,1 , the simulated stock and 
foreign currency return series ][ str Tt ,...,1=  and the alternative investment strategy 
vector, ][x , under consideration were used to evaluate recursively the final value of 
reserves at terminal date T. We measure the effect of each alternative investment 
strategy as the average percentage difference of simulated over actual terminal value, 
i.e. TT VVE /)(∆ . We also measure the downside risk as the probability that the fund’s 
simulated reserves might be equal to or lower than actual reserves, i.e. 
pVV TT =≤ )Pr( .  
To get a better handling of risk, we calculate two Value at Risk measures at 
standard confidence levels18 95% and 99% defined as percentage differences of the 
                                               
18
 The first measure is used in Riskmetrics of J.P.Morgan and the second measure is the Basel 
Committee rule [Jorion (2001, p.121)]. 
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corresponding percentile reserves over actual terminal reserves, i.e., T
c
T VV /∆  where 
c
TV  such that cVV
c
TT −=≤ 1)Pr( . The two VaR measures correspond to a required 
level of minimum reserves19 as a protection against adverse stock market conditions. 
We also calculate a measure called Beyond Value at Risk20, i.e. T
b
T VV /∆  where 
b
TV  is 
equal to the conditional expectation )( cTTT VVVE ≤ . This VaR measure is 
appropriate for fat tailed return distributions.21   
 
4. International Investment Yields under Fixed and Floating Rates Regimes 
Technical rules imposed on Greek pension funds limited investment choices to 
mandatory and demand deposits, treasury bills and bonds and to a small extent to 
equity. The constrained choices are more severe since reserves could be invested only 
in domestic assets excluding deposits in foreign assets. In this section we describe the 
methodology being followed to reserves deposited in foreign treasury bonds to 
overcome the problem of a mixed exchange rate regime throughout the sample period. 
Investing in international capital markets may improve pension fund finance in 
terms of higher returns and risk reducing diversification. However, international 
diversification of fund reserves introduces additional sources of risk, foreign 
exchange risk and sovereign-political risk. Although it is not impossible to limit the 
exposure to the latter by selecting stable and well developed capital markets, the 
former type of risk has always been a concern to the international investor. Multiple 
currencies instead of single currency investment may alleviate the exchange risk 
exposure of pension fund reserves. 
                                               
19
 According to Jorion (2001, p. 384-5) this is the equivalent to “economic capital.” 
20
 Also known as Conditional Value at Risk or Mean Shortfall 
21
 See Artzner et al. (1999) 
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 In assessing the effect of introducing some degree of international 
diversification into Greek pension funds investment, it is necessary to take into 
account both the inception and the elimination of a number of exchange rates regimes. 
For example, during the 1950’s and 1960’s, a period when fund reserves were 
building up due to favorable Social Security demographics, the Greek foreign 
exchange market operated under a firm set of trade barriers and capital mobility 
restrictions and the Greek drachma to US dollar rate did not move at all in accordance 
to the country’s commitments to the Breton-Woods agreements. However, during this 
period a parallel or ‘black’ market was usually created by those traders and investors 
trying to circumvent exchange market rulings.  
 On the other hand, an equally important part of our sample refers to the period 
following the act of the US to unilaterally revoke the dollar to gold conversion and the 
subsequent introduction of a floating exchange rates regime in 1973. Although some 
countries left their currencies float freely many others including Greece preserved 
their trade and capital mobility restrictions so that their official exchange rate 
variations serve their economic targets of growth, balance of payment and 
employment. The regime of free nonetheless pegged float was followed by a series of 
attempts to attain exchange rate stability in Europe by setting price limits around a 
fixed central parity, by gradually reducing those limits and by providing for the 
operation of European exchange rate intervention mechanism. Despite the currency 
stability sought this period exhibited important exchange rate variation either in terms 
of depreciation or appreciation, i.e. movements around central parity and within price 
limits, or in terms of devaluation or re-evaluation of the central parity itself. 
 Within this period under investigation with a mixture of exchange rate regimes 
there is one methodological question issue that arises: How one could backtest the 
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risk and returns of international investment as if exchange rates were moving freely 
when in fact were not, using variables that overcome this problem. In other words, 
how could one introduce currency variation in local currency returns of the 
international investment, when exchange rate were fixed for some period or supported 
by market restrictions over almost the entire period? In order to respond to this 
requirement, we undertake the task to re-construct the series of exchange rates that 
would prevail in free floating in order to restore external equilibrium conditional on 
the selection of an appropriate model of exchange rate determination.  
 Kouretas & Zarangas (1998) propose a solution to the similar, in our opinion, 
problem of explaining the variation of the parallel or ‘black market’ exchange rate, 
pte , as opposed to the official rate, ote , during periods of varying degrees of market 
restrictions. In setting up their model they assume two types of international 
arbitrageurs: financial arbitrageurs whose excess demand for foreign currency is equal 
to (⋅k pte - ote )  where k  is their elasticity of currency demand, and goods 
arbitrageurs whose corresponding excess demand is equal to (⋅λ pte - tPPP )  where 
λ  is the corresponding elasticity of currency demand, tPPP *tt PP −≡  the purchasing 
power parity (all variables are expressed in logarithms), and P(P*) is the domestic 
(foreign) price level. Taking differences we come up with the “true” variation of the 
exchange rate which is not other than the variation of the parallel market rate 
assuming unitary elasticities of demand and zero aggregate excess demand for 
currency:  
  )( *ππ −+∆=∆ otrue ee       (3) 
where the last term denotes the inflation differential between home and abroad. 
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 Following the aforementioned strategy we calculate a series of “true” 
exchange rate annual variations for the US dollar and the German mark. Official 
exchange rates are stated as local currency units per one unit of foreign currency and 
inflation differentials are based on the corresponding variation of consumer price 
indices, home and foreign. Original series are end of year levels retrieved from the 
International Financial Statistics Website and ‘true’ variation is expressed in 
percentage rates.  
 Time series variation of the ‘true’ US dollar rate (denoted DR/USD) and the 
German mark (denoted DR/DM) against the Greek drachma are depicted in Figure 3. 
 
Insert Figure 3 here 
 
Inspection of Figure 3 reveals the drastic devaluation of the drachma in 1950 
and 1953, the depreciation that followed the Breton-Woods agreements debacle in 
1973, the 1983 devaluation by the Papandreou government, and the two less dramatic 
currency crises of 1992 and 1997. 
 Local currency yields in US and German Treasury bonds are defined as: 
  
 USD
DR
USD
DR
USD eYY ∆+=   and  MD
DR
DM
DR
DM eYY ∆+=  
where exchange rate variations are defined on the basis of the “true” rates.  
 Local currency yields in US and German Treasury bonds are depicted in 
Figure 4. Inspection of Figure 4 shows the high inflation, high interest and weak 
currency 1980’s, the currency crises of 1992 and 1997. The yield on the Greek 12-
month Treasury bill is included for the sake of comparison. 
Insert Figure 4 here 
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5. Empirical Results 
In this Section we present the risk and return of a number of alternative investment 
strategies that depart from the ‘mandatory and demand deposits only’ restriction 
imposed on the pension funds decision-makers during the larger part of the period 
under study. 
 In Table 1 we present the results for a ‘stocks only’ strategy. Historical 
‘mandatory and demand deposits’ portfolios are replaced by a portfolio of x% riskless 
placements (equally divided in savings and time deposits with Greek banks and Greek 
Treasury bills and bonds) and a risky component (Greek equity) of 1-x%. Columns 2-
6 refer to an equity component of 1-x% from 0 to 40%. For example, the 9X1 
investment vector of a 10% ‘stocks only’ strategy would be: 
[0   0   0.225   0.225   0.225   0.225   0.10   0   0]’ 
where the first two zeros refer to the absence of a mandatory and demand deposit 
component, the next four 22.5% weights refer to a 90% riskless portfolio equally 
divided in two types of Bank deposits and two types of Treasury securities, the 10% 
weight is the Greek equity component, while the last two zeros indicate the absence of 
foreign currency in the pension fund’s portfolio. 
 In Table 2 we present the results for a ‘stocks and currency’ strategy where 
historical ‘mandatory and demand deposits’ portfolios are replaced by a portfolio 
consisting of x% riskless portfolio, same as above, and a risky component of 1-x% 
equally split between Greek equity and foreign currency (half in US Treasury bonds 
and half in German Treasury bonds). Columns 2-6 refer to a risky component of 1-x% 
from 0 to 40%. This time, for example, the 9x1 investment vector of a 40% ‘stocks 
and currency’ strategy would be:  
[0   0   0.15   0.15   0.15   0.15   0.20   0.10   0.10]’  
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where the first two zeros indicate again no mandatory or sight deposit component, the 
next four 15.0% weights refer to a 60% riskless portfolio equally divided again in two 
types of Bank deposits and two types of Treasury securities, the 20% weight is the 
Greek equity component, while the last two 10% weights indicate the percentage 
investment in foreign currency placed in US and German Treasury bonds. Investment 
weights in Greek equity and in the two foreign bonds sum to a 40% risky component. 
Tables 1 and 2 reveal the stabilizing effect of international diversification in 
terms of probability and downside risk which, however, comes at a cost through an 
inferior return on pension reserves. In fact ‘stocks only’ strategies dominate (Table 1, 
line 1), at all levels of stock, ‘stocks and currency’ strategies (Table 2, line 1). On the 
other hand, ‘stocks and currency’ strategies dominate ‘stocks only’ strategies with 
respect to each and every measure of downside risk (Tables 1 and 2 lines 2 to 6), 
again at all level of  stock.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Risk and return on pension reserves (1958 - 2000) stocks only 1) 
stock % 0 0,10 0,20 0,30 0,40 
Effect 2) 0,0543 0,1963 0,3771 0,6122 0,9345 
Risk 3)  0,0288 0,0602 0,0848 0,0890 
VaR.1 4)  -0,0264 -0,0914 -0,1676 -0,2272 
VaR.5 4)  0,0173 -0,0135 -0,0534 -0,0857 
bVaR.1 5)  -0,0450 -0,1279 -0,2119 -0,2818 
bVaR.5 5)  -0,0095 -0,0633 -0,1259 -0,1723 
Source: International Financial Statistics Website and our calculations 
 
Notes:  
1)
  Stock returns are generated with the balanced bootstrap method described in the 
methodology section 
2) 
 Simulated minus actual terminal reserves (%)  
3)
  Probability of simulated wealth falling below actual terminal reserves 
4)
 VaR at confidence levels of 99% and 95% over actual terminal reserves (%) 
 5)
  Conditional VaR at 99% and 95% over actual terminal reserves (%)   
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 To examine further the risk return trade-off between ‘stocks only’ and ‘stocks 
and currency’ strategies, we construct Figures 5 and 6 for the 10% and 40% weight on 
stocks, respectively.  
 
Insert Figure 5 here 
 
Modes both in the 10% and almost probably in the 40% ‘stocks only’ 
distribution of returns dominate those of ‘stocks and currency’ corresponding 
strategies, indicating that, on the average, the first strategy offers a higher return vis-à-
vis the second strategy. However, over the range of low or negative returns 10% and 
40% ‘stocks and currency’ strategies are dominated by the distribution of ‘stocks 
only’ corresponding strategies. The graphical evidence provided by Figures 5 and 6 
indicates that substituting foreign currency for stocks in the risky portfolio of a 
pension fund’s reserves, would drastically reduce the fund’s downside risk and would 
Table 2: Risk and return on pension reserves (1958-2000) stocks & currency 1) 
stock % &   currency 0,10 0,20 0,30 0,40 
Effect 2)  0,1669 0,3003 0,4771 0,6947 
Risk 3)  0 0,0012 0,0028 0,0034 
VaR.1 4)  0,0513 0,0575 0,0458 0,0540 
VaR.5 4)  0,0777 0,1031 0,1284 0,1664 
bVaR.1 5)  0,0413 0,0318 0,0111 0,0115 
bVaR.5 5)  0,0620 0,0734 0,0782 0,0995 
Source: International Financial Statistics Website and our calculations 
 
Notes:  
1)
  Stock returns are generated with the balanced bootstrap method described in the 
methodology section 
2) 
 Simulated minus actual terminal reserves (%)  
3)
 Probability of simulated wealth falling below actual terminal reserves4) VaR at confidence 
levels of 99% and 95% over actual terminal reserves (%) 
 5)
  Conditional VaR at 99% and 95% over actual terminal reserves (%)   
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consequently end up in a positive terminal excess return, maybe not maximal but 
definitely less volatile with respect to alternative investment strategies. 
 
Insert Figure 6 here 
 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
In this paper we analyzed the Greek social security system to study the potential loss 
to it caused by the restrictive investment policy imposed on pension funds. The paper 
builds on the work of Milonas et al. (2006) and examines the effect of relaxing the 
investment restriction on the level of terminal reserves and the associated risk 
assuming that pension funds had the flexibility to invest not only in fixed investments 
but in equities as well as in foreign bonds.  
The results of the paper signify the beneficial role of more diversified 
investments on the level of risk of reserves. Directing only 10% of reserves into 
equity investment enhances terminal reserves by 19.6%. This enhancement increases 
to 37.7%, 61.2%, and 93.5% of reserves when equity investment makes up 20%, 30%, 
and 40% of the reserves, respectively. As expected, this significant value 
enhancement in reserves comes with some risk which, however, remains at low and 
reasonable levels. 
Furthermore, when reserves, besides equity, can be directed in foreign bonds 
as well, there is a great reduction in the risk to minimal levels even in the most risky 
case considered, that is, 40% of reserves equally allocated to Greek equities and 
foreign bonds. 
In line to our expectations, the reduction of risk in reserves when part of the 
risky investment is allocated to foreign bonds is accompanied with lower value 
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enhancement to reserves compared with the strategy when stocks were the only risky 
element in the portfolio. Yet, our results illustrate that investment in foreign currency 
act as a limiting force to downside risk while adding significant value enhancement to 
reserves. 
The results of the paper help us identify the magnitude of the opportunity cost 
to pension funds reserves when investment rules confines pension investments to 
domestic assets only and minimum exposure to equity investment.. Up to the adoption 
of euro in 2001, Greece used the drachma, a weak currency, and investing abroad 
would act as a hedge against repeated drachma devaluations, as our results imply. 
Nowadays, in the presence of globalization and in the case of Greece which shares the 
same currency with other Eurozone countries, it seems odd to prohibit pension funds 
from placing reserves into foreign assets in an era where, at the other extreme, other 
pension funds are allowed to invest only in foreign assets.22 Furthermore, the results 
of the paper provide policy recommendation to country officials to shift investment 
rules to more flexible investment policy that recognizes the need to enhance return 
while getting the benefits of diversification. Such a policy shift is easier to be 
implemented compared to the needed reform on the pension fund system. In addition, 
because pension fund reserves are inadequate and the system is not viable yet, 
relaxing the investment constraints will give additional support to the system until the 
needed reforms are put to work.  
 
 
                                               
22
 This is the case with the Norwegian Public Pension Fund. Source: Pension Funds in Focus, 
November issue 2007. 
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Figure 1: Yields on Greek bank deposits and securities, 1958-2000 
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Figure 2: Portfolio composition of Greek pension reserves, 1958-2000 
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Figure 3: ‘True’ exchange rate variations of US Dollar and German Mark, 
1958-2000 
 
 30 
-20,00
-10,00
0,00
10,00
20,00
30,00
40,00
50,00
60,00
70,00
1
9
5
8
1
9
6
3
1
9
6
8
1
9
7
3
1
9
7
8
1
9
8
3
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
8
Yusd Ydm Ygdr
Figure 4: Local currency yields of US and German Treasury bonds, 
1958-2000 
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Figure 5: Distribution of reserves excess return (10% risky assets), 
1958-2000 
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Figure 6: Distribution of reserves excess return (40% risky assets),  
1958-2000 
